The credence-one view of belief says that belief is having credence one or maximal confidence. Traditionally, the credence-one view has been considered implausible. Recently, Clarke (2013, Philosopher's Imprint 13 (11)) and Greco (2015, Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1): 179–201) have proposed that the credence-one view is tenable when it is combined with doxastic sensitivism, according to which beliefs are sensitive to contextual factors such as practical factors and salience of error possibilities. They also argue that this version of the credence-one view, called credence-one sensitivism, fares better than the threshold view according to which belief consists in having credence above some threshold below 1. In this paper, I defend the threshold view against credence-one sensitivism. I argue that a threshold view is better placed than credence-one sensitivism in accounting for several important desiderata of belief.