On t he Generality A rgument for the Knowledge Norm
Davide Fassio  1@  
1 : Zhejiang University

An increasingly popular view in contemporary epistemology holds that the most fundamental norm governing belief is knowledge. According to this norm one shouldn't believe what one doesn't know. A prominent argument for the knowledge norm appeals to the claim that knowledge is the most general condition of epistemic assessment of belief, one entailing all other conditions under which we epistemically assess beliefs (truth, evidence, reliability...). This norm would provide an easy and straightforward explanation of why we assess beliefs along all these various epistemic dimensions. In my talk, I argue that this line of argument is ultimately unsuccessful. I show that the main premise of the argument actually supports the opposite conclusion: the norm of belief requires a condition weaker than knowledge. Furthermore, I argue that if we hold on to the assumption that knowledge is the most general condition of belief's epistemic assessment, the fundamental norm of belief is factive: one is not permitted to believe a proposition p if it is not true that p.


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