As formulated by Mill (1843/1947: 213-214), the problem of causal selection is that of explaining the priority given to a determinant or set of determinants as the cause of a target event in contrast to the complex sum of all determinants in its past light cone (the background conditions). If reality is represented as a directed, uniform network of causal interactions, is there a metaphysical basis for the distinction drawn between causes and conditions, or is it just a discretionary and indiscriminate matter? While causal selection received considerable critical attention (Hesslow 1988, Waters 2007, Schaffer 2012, Franklin-Hall 2015), there has been little discussion about an apparently similar mechanism operating on the effect side of causal relations. From an analogous Millian angle, the real Effect is the whole set of consequents and no clear explanation is offered for the priority typically given to a consequent or set of consequents (the effect) over other results (by-products, side-effects, after-effects, etc.). The main goal of the paper is to explore effect selection and assess its relevance to determining the appropriate extent of moral responsibility for consequences. I argue that the difficulties in the way of a clear answer to the puzzle of effect selection motivate an epistemic argument against consequentialism.