In this paper I point at an introspective phenomenon, which I call primitive introspection, and propose an account of its nature. At a first approximation, primitive introspection is non-classificatory introspection of phenomenal states, where by non-classificatory I mean not involving recognizing the introspected phenomenal state as an instance of a certain experience type. My principal aim is to develop a version of the acquaintance account to explain the metaphysical structure of the mental state the subject is in when they primitively introspect. First, I present what I take to be the most promising acquaintance account of phenomenal state introspection in the current literature, namely Brie Gertler's (2001). After pointing at a challenge faced by Gertler's account, I propose my own version of the acquaintance account as an improvement on Gertler's. I call it the integration account of primitive introspection.