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Ethical consequentialism has trouble with infinities. If our universe contains infinitely many instances of moral value (as is suggested by contemporary cosmology), then standard forms of consequentialism imply that the total value in the universe is infinite (or otherwise undefined). This holds for all actions we might take. In any given case, then, which action maximises moral value? Any will do. All acts are permissible, and no acts are prohibited, no matter how repugnant.
Fortunately, solutions have been proposed. Foremost among these is the expansionist approach of Vallentyne and Kagan. Instead of comparing the universal total, their approach aggregates value across the world in some particular order, and then compares the cumulative total. If the cumulative total of one possible world surpasses another and remains in the lead forevermore, then that is considered the better world.
This approach (and many others) encounters a serious problem. It requires an order in which to aggregate value, and the only applicable natural ordering is the positioning of value in space and time. This positioning, however, is subject to special relativity – the order is relative to the speed of the observer. There are cases, then, in which we might reverse moral judgements simply by moving at speed.
I show that there is a solution. First, we must ascribe value not to discrete points but to regions of continuous points, in proportion to their duration. Second, we can order value according to the spacetime interval – the only speed-invariant measure available. This has substantive ethical implications.
