

The Grounding Problem and Intrinsically Composed Colocated Objects

Colocationism claims that two non-identical objects can be composed of the same parts. One of the most challenging questions for *colocationism* is the *grounding problem*: what grounds the difference in, for example, sortal properties of two colocated objects? Catherine Sutton has recently offered a new ingenious answer to it. She distinguishes between *extrinsically* and *intrinsically composed* objects and claims that two colocated objects share their parts, but at most one of them is *intrinsically composed*. Moreover, when the two objects are *extrinsically composed*, the relations that their parts stand in to other things are different. This is Sutton's answer to the *grounding problem*: the different relations that the shared parts of two colocated objects enter into ground the objects' different sortal properties.

In this paper I argue, against what Sutton claims, that pieces of matter are *intrinsically composed*. This implies that there are *intrinsically composed* colocated objects. However, Sutton has no answer to the grounding problem for this kind of case. Moreover, I formulate my own account, which although it has some features in common with Sutton's, it takes appropriately into account cases in which the two colocated objects are both *intrinsically composed*. I introduce the concepts of a *process of coming-into-existence* and of the *minimal-internal-structural-configuration of an intrinsically composed object* and then I elaborate my answer to the grounding problem: the fact that two objects have different sortal properties is grounded in the fact that the processes of *coming-into-existence* of the two objects are different in a significant way.