I accept as a given the Canadian feminist philosopher Sue Campbell’s account of memory as relational and reconstructive, as opposed to an archival cognitive faculty. Campbell’s view of memory flies in the face of the Lockean view of memory where memory is viewed as a guarantor of personal identity solely on the basis of the self’s accurate recollection of past events. While Campbell’s many works on memory engage with the disastrous social, political, and ethical implications of the Lockean model of memory, especially as far as women rememberers are concerned, my presentation will, instead, seek to best situate the relational account of memory within an appropriate metaphysical and epistemological framework. I will seek help in Bertrand Russell’s philosophy after 1921, known as the neutral monist period when he accepted the theory of neutral monism as the basis of his own epistemology and metaphysics. I will argue that Russell’s version of neutral monism is the most developed one, in comparison to those of Ernst Mach and William James, for example. I will show that Russell’s version of neutral monism is not incompatible with panpsychism, much preferred by some feminists, framework which, among other things, avoids dualism, in general, and mind-body dualism, in particular. Working from a genuinely neutral monist vantage point spares us the need to adopt an either-or stand with regards to narrativism and episodism both of which have entangled the personal identity debate for the past little while. However, there is a sense of episodism that I will accept, namely, the view that takes episodic memory, that is, autobiographical memory of events that have happened to the rememberer herself to be the paradigmatic memory upon which all other types of memory (e.g., intellectual memory) are based. This allows me to take the rememberer as autonomous, embodied, emotional, rational, and social being all at the same time, without a real conceptual tension. In other words, my contention is that a relational account of memory does not have to eliminate continuity altogether while at the same time, it does not have to commit to a fully episodist view, either. Both narratism and episodism with regards to memory and personal identity fall short of giving a fair and well thought-out account of traumatic memory, for example, of significant interest to feminists. Thus, the relational account of memory, best placed in a neutral monist framework, has the capacity to give an account of what is meant by reliable rememberer as well as expose some of the discriminatory practices that deny women the status of reliable remembers.